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Abstract
Optimistic fair exchange (OFE) is a protocol for solving the problem of exchanging items or services in a fair manner between
two parties, a signer and a verifier, with the help of an arbitrator which is called in only when a dispute happens between the two
parties. In almost all the previous work on OFE, after obtaining a partial signature from the signer, the verifier can present it to
others and show that the signer has indeed committed itself to something corresponding to the partial signature even prior to the
completion of the transaction. In some scenarios, this capability given to the verifier may be harmful to the signer. In this paper, we
propose the notion of ambiguous optimistic fair exchange (AOFE), which is a variant of OFE, requires additionally that the verifier
cannot convince anybody about the authorship of a partial signature generated by the signer. We present a formal security model for
AOFE in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model, and propose a generic construction of AOFE that is provably secure under
our model. Furthermore, we propose an efficient instantiation of the generic construction, security of which is based on Strong
Diffie-Hellman assumption and Decision Linear assumption without random oracles.
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1. Introduction
Optimistic Fair Exchange (OFE) allows two parties to fairly
exchange information in such a way that at the end of a protocol
run, either both parties have obtained the complete information
from one another or none of them has obtained anything from
the counter party. In an OFE, there is a third party, called Ar-
bitrator, which is only called in when a dispute occurred be-
tween the two parties. OFE is a useful tool in practice, for
example, it can be used for performing contract signing, fair
negotiation and similar applications on the Internet. Since its
introduction [1], there have been many OFE schemes proposed
[2, 16, 3, 11, 33, 15, 29, 32, 38, 4, 34, 14, 26, 35]. For all recent-
ly proposed schemes, an OFE protocol for signature typically
consists of three message flows. The initiator of OFE, Alice,
first sends a partial signature σP to a responder, Bob, where
σP is considered as Alice’s partial commitment to her full sig-
nature which will be sent to Bob. But beforehand, Bob should
send his full signature back to Alice first in the second message
flow. After receiving Bob’s full signature, Alice then sends her
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full signature to Bob in the third message flow. If Bob refuses
to send his full signature to Alice in the second message flow,
σP should have no use to Bob, so that Alice has no concern
about giving away σP. However, after Bob has sent his full sig-
nature to Alice while Alice refuses to send her full signature
in the third message flow, then Bob can ask the Arbitrator to
retrieve Alice’s full signature from σP by sending both σP and
Bob’s full signature to the Arbitrator. To the best of our knowl-
edge, among almost all the known OFE schemes, there is one
common property about Alice’s partial signature σP which has
neither been captured in any of the security models for OFE nor
been considered as a requirement for OFE. The property is that
once σP is given out, at least one of the following statements is
true.
1. Everyone can verify that Alice generates σP, because
σP, similar to a standard digital signature, has the non-
repudiation property with respect to Alice’s public key;
2. Bob can show to anybody that Alice is the signer of σP.
For example, in [14, 26], the partial signature of Alice is a stan-
dard signature, which can only be generated by Alice. In many
other OFE schemes, Alice’s signature is encrypted under the
arbitrator’s public key, and then a non-interactive proof is gen-
erated to show that the ciphertext indeed contains a signature of
Alice. This is known as verifiably encrypted signature. How-
ever, regarding the validity and non-repudiation of a signature,
as pointed out by Boyd and Foo [10], this raises the question of
whether a non-interactive proof that a signature is encrypted is
really having any difference from a signature itself, as the proof
is already sufficient to convince any third party that the signer
has committed to the message.
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This property may cause no concern in some applications,
for example, in those where only the full signature is deemed
to have some actual value to the receiving party. However, it
may be undesirable in some other applications. Since σP is
publicly verifiable and non-repudiative, σP has evidently shown
Alice’s commitment to the corresponding message. This may
incur some unfair situation, to the advantage of Bob, if Bob
does not send out his full signature. In contract signing appli-
cations, this could be undesirable because σP can already be
considered as Alice’s undeniable commitment to a contract in
court while there is no evidence showing that Bob has commit-
ted to anything. For example, Alice wants to sign with Bob
a contract of procuring Bob’s company. After sending out her
partial signature, Alice has no way to regret and cannot with-
draw the procurement if Bob persists. However, Bob can pause
the contract signing, and use Alice’s partial signature to bar-
gain for better offers with others. He then carries out a new
OFE protocol with the one offering the best price to sign the
contract. Bob can play the same trick iteratively until that no
one can give an even better offer.
For making OFE be applicable to more applications and
practical scenarios, in this paper, we propose to enhance the
security requirements of OFE and construct a new OFE scheme
which does not have the problems mentioned above. One may
also think of this as an effort to make OFE more admissible as
a viable fair exchange tool for real applications. We will build
an OFE scheme which not only satisfies all the existing securi-
ty requirements of OFE (with respect to the strongest security
model available [26]), but in addition to that, will also have σP
be not self-authenticating and unable for Bob to demonstrate to
others that Alice has committed herself to something. We call
this enhanced notion of OFE as Ambiguous Optimistic Fair Ex-
change (AOFE). It inherits all the formalized properties of OFE
[14, 26] and has a new property introduced: signer ambiguity.
It requires that a partial signature σP generated by Alice or Bob
should look alike and be indistinguishable even to Alice and
Bob.
1.1. Related Works
There have been many OFE schemes proposed in the past
[2, 3, 11, 33, 15, 29, 32, 38, 4, 34, 14, 26]. In the following,
we review some recent ones by starting from 2003 when Park,
Chong and Siegel [33] proposed an OFE based on sequential
two-party multi-signature. It was later broken and repaired by
Dodis and Reyzin [15]. The scheme is setup-driven [39, 40],
which requires all users to register their keys with the arbitrator
prior to conducting any transaction. In [32], Micali proposed
another scheme based on a CCA2 secure public key encryption
with the property of recoverable randomness (i.e., both plain-
text and randomness used for generating the ciphertext can be
retrieved during decryption). Later, Bao et al. [4] showed that
the scheme is not fair, where a dishonest party, Bob, can obtain
the full commitment of another party, Alice, without letting Al-
ice get his obligation. They also proposed a fix to defend against
the attack.
In PKC 2007, Dodis, Lee and Yum [14] considered OFE in
a multi-user setting. Prior to their work, almost all previous re-
sults considered the single-user setting only which consists of
a single signer and a single verifier (along with an arbitrator).
The more practical multi-user setting considers a system to have
multiple signers and verifiers (along with the arbitrator), so that
a dishonest party can collude with other parties in an attempt
of cheating. Dodis et al. [14] showed that security of OFE in
the single-user setting does not necessarily imply the security
in the multi-user setting. They also proposed a formal defini-
tion of OFE in the multi-user setting, and proposed a generic
construction, which is setup-free (i.e. no key registration is re-
quired between users and the arbitrator) and can be built in the
random oracle model [5] if there exist one-way functions, or
in the standard model if there exist trapdoor one-way permuta-
tions.
In CT-RSA 2008, Huang, Yang, Wong and Susilo [26] con-
sidered OFE in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model,
in which the adversary is allowed to choose public keys arbi-
trarily without showing its knowledge of the corresponding pri-
vate keys. Prior to their work, the security of all previous OFE
schemes (including the one in [14]) are proven in a more re-
stricted model, called certified-key model, which requires the
adversary to prove its knowledge of the corresponding private
key before using a public key. In [26], Huang et al. gave a
formal security model for OFE in the multi-user setting and
chosen-key model, and proposed an efficient OFE scheme based
on ring signature. In their scheme, a partial signature is a con-
ventional signature and a full signature is a two-member ring
signature in additional to the conventional signature. The secu-
rity of their scheme was proven without relying on the random
oracle assumption.
In [16], Garay, Jakobsson and MacKenzie introduced a sim-
ilar notion for optimistic contract signing, named abuse-freeness.
It requires that no party can ever prove to a third party that he is
capable of choosing whether to validate or invalidate a contract.
They also proposed a construction of abuse-free optimistic con-
tract signing protocol. The security of their scheme is based on
DDH assumption under the random oracle model. Besides they
did not consider the multi-user setting for their contract signing
protocol.
Liskov and Micali [30] proposed an online-untransferable
signature scheme, which can be considered as an enhanced ver-
sion of designated confirmer signature. In such a scheme, there
is also a party (confirmer) semi-trusted by both the signer and
the recipient. A dishonest recipient, who is interacting with a
signer, cannot convince a third party that the signature is gen-
erated by the signer. But both the signer and the conformer are
able to convert a signature so that anyone can identity its owner.
The online non-transferability of their scheme is similar to the
signer ambiguity (see Def. 2) of AOFE. However, the online
attack considered in [30] would not happen in AOFE, as the
signature generation and verification are both non-interactive.
Besides, the signing process of their scheme requires several
rounds of interaction with the recipient, and the scheme works
in the certified-key model and is not setup-free, i.e. there is a
setup stage between each signer and the confirmer, and the con-
firmer needs to store a public/secret key pair for each signer.
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(Works After [25]). There have been multiple works since the
introduction of AOFE. To name a few, Chen et al. [13] in-
troduced a new notion of Verifiable Encryption of Chameleon
Signatures, and used it to construct a three-round abuse-free
optimistic protocol for contract signing. A somewhat generic
transform from designated confirmer signature (DCS) to AOFE
was proposed in [20, 21]. The underlying DCS scheme is re-
quired to enjoy a property named samplability, while is satisfied
by only a few DCS schemes. The transform was later refined in
[23], where the DCS is only required to satisfy standard prop-
erties, e.g. unforgeability and anonymity. A new notion called
group-oriented optimistic fair exchange was proposed in [22],
which considers the fair exchange between two groups of user-
s, keeping the anonymity of the signer in its group. Anoth-
er enhanced version of AOFE, named Perfect AOFE, was pro-
posed in [36], in which a partial signature leaks no information
about the actual signer or the intended verifier. This is useful
for applications where the involved parties of an exchange wish
to further protect their privacy on whether they are indeed in-
volved in an exchange or not. This notion was further improved
very recently. Privacy-preserving OFE was proposed in [24], in
which the arbitrator could not learn the full signature even after
the resolution process. Very recently, another variant of AOFE
called Attributed-based Optimistic Fair Exchange, was intro-
duced in [37], which integrates the advantage of both AOFE and
(Ciphertext-Policy) Attributed-Based Encryption. Only the ver-
ifier who possesses appropriate credentials (issued by a creden-
tial center according to its attributes) can convert the signer’s
partial signature into a full one. It is worthy to notice that the
schemes proposed in [20, 21, 23, 24] are secure in the certified-
key model, while the schemes proposed in this work and [37]
are secure in the chosen-key model.
1.2. Our Work
In this paper we make the following contributions. First,
we propose the notion of Ambiguous Optimistic Fair Exchange
(Ambiguous OFE, or AOFE in short) which allows a signer Al-
ice to generate a partial signature in such a way that a verifier
Bob cannot convince anyone about the authorship of this partial
signature, and thus cannot prove to anybody that Alice commit-
ted herself to anything prematurely. Realizing the notion needs
to make the partial signature ambiguous with respect to Alice
and Bob. We will see that this requires us to include both Alice
and Bob’s public keys into the signing and verification algo-
rithms of AOFE.
Second, for formalizing AOFE, we propose a strong secu-
rity model in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model. Be-
sides the existing security requirements for OFE, that is, resolu-
tion ambiguity (the ambiguity considered in [14, 26]), security
against signers, security against verifiers and security against
the arbitrator, AOFE has an additional requirement: signer am-
biguity. It requires that the verifier can generate partial sig-
natures which are (computationally) indistinguishable from the
partial signatures generated by the signer. We also evaluate the
relations among the security requirements and show that if a
scheme has security against the arbitrator and (a weaker form
of) signer ambiguity, then it has (a weaker form of) security
against verifiers.
Third, we revisit two generic methods in constructing OFE
[14, 26], and show that if we simply extend them to the con-
struction of AOFE, the resulting schemes would be insecure.
Specifically, they are insecure against the arbitrator under our
proposed model.
Fourth, we propose a generic AOFE construction. It is based
on the generic OFE construction of [14], but instead of using
a CCA secure encryption scheme, an existentially unforgeable
signature scheme under chosen message attacks and a simulation-
sound NIZK proof system, we employ a selective-tag weakly
CCA secure tag-based encryption [28], a weakly unforgeable
signature [7], a strong one-time signature and a general NIZK
proof system. The security of the generic construction is proven
secure under our proposed multi-user setting and chosen-key
model.
Last but not least, we propose a concrete and efficient in-
stantiation of our generic construction of AOFE, the security of
which is based on the intractability of Strong Diffie-Hellman
problem and Decision Linear problem without random oracles.
(Differences from [25]). In this paper we make the following
changes, compared with [25]. First of all, the model of signer
ambiguity is revised to correct some minor issue in [25]. Sec-
ond, the proof of the theorem on the relation between signer
ambiguity and security against verifiers (Theorem 1) is revised
to improve the reduction factor. Third, a new section (Sec. 3)
is added to discuss about the insecurity of simple extensions of
two generic constructions of OFE to AOFE. Fourth, a generic
construction of AOFE is proposed (in Sec. 4) with detailed se-
curity proofs, which covers the efficient construction proposed
in [25].
1.3. Paper Organization
In the next section, we define AOFE and propose a securi-
ty model. We then show some relation among the formalized
security requirements. A popular generic construction used in
building OFE schemes is revisited in Sec. 4, and a new generic
construction of AOFE is proposed and proved. In Sec. 5 we
give an efficient instantiation of the construction, security of
which does not rely on the random oracle heuristic. The paper
is concluded in Sec. 6.
2. Ambiguous Optimistic Fair Exchange
In AOFE, we require that after receiving a partial signature
σP from Alice (the signer), Bob (the verifier) cannot convince
others but himself that Alice has committed to σP. This proper-
ty is analogous to the non-transferability of designated verifier
signature [27] and the ambiguity of concurrent signature [12].
Also, the AOFE verification algorithm should take the public
keys of both signer and (designated) verifier as inputs, in con-
trast to that in the traditional definition of OFE [2, 14, 26].
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Definition 1 (Ambiguous Optimistic Fair Exchange). A (non-
interactive) ambiguous optimistic fair exchange (AOFE) scheme
involves two users, i.e. a signer and a verifier, and an arbitra-
tor, and consists of the following probabilistic polynomial-time
(PPT) algorithms:
• PMGen: On input 1k where k is a security parameter, it
outputs the system parameter PM.
• SetupTTP: On input PM, the algorithm generates a pub-
lic arbitration key APK and a secret arbitration key AS K.
• SetupUser: On input PM and (optionally) APK, the algo-
rithm outputs a public/secret key pair (PK, S K). For user
Ui, we use (PKi, S Ki) to denote its key pair.
• Sig and Ver: Sig(M, S Ki, PKi, PK j, APK) outputs a (ful-
l) signature σF on M of user Ui with the designated ver-
ifier U j, where message M is chosen by user Ui from the
message space M defined under PKi, while Ver(M, σF ,
PKi, PK j, APK) outputs 1 or 0, indicating σF is Ui’s
valid full signature on M with designated verifier U j or
not.
• PSig and PVer: They are partial signing and verification
algorithms respectively. PSig(M, S Ki, PKi, PK j, APK)
outputs a partial signature σP, while PVer(M, σP,PK,
APK) outputs 1 or 0, where PK = {PKi, PK j}.
• Res: This is the resolution algorithm. Res(M, σP, AS K,
PK), where PK = {PKi, PK j}, outputs a full signature
σF , or ⊥ indicating the failure of resolving a partial sig-
nature.
It is required that there is an efficient algorithm which given
a pair (PK, S K), verifies if S K matches PK, i.e. (PK, S K) is an
output of algorithm SetupUser. As in [14], PSig together with
Res should be functionally equivalent to Sig.
Correctness: for any k ∈ N, PM ← PMGen(1k), (APK,
AS K) ← SetupTTP(PM), (PKi, S Ki) ← SetupUser (PM, APK),
(PK j, S K j)← SetupUser(PM, APK), and M ∈ {0, 1}∗, let PK =
{PKi, PK j},σP ← PSig(M, S Ki, PKi, PK j, APK),σF ← Sig(M,
S Ki, PKi, PK j, APK), we have:
PVer(M, σP,PK, APK) = 1,
Ver(M, σF , PKi, PK j, APK) = 1,
and Ver(M,Res(M, σP, AS K,PK), PKi, PK j, APK) = 1.
2.1. Security Properties
Chosen-key Model. We consider the security of AOFE in the
multi-user setting [14] and the chosen-key model, which was
introduced by Lysyanskaya et al. [31] in the context of sequen-
tial aggregate signature. In the chosen-key model, the adver-
sary can choose any public key, except that the challenge/target
public key(s) should be honestly generated. We also require
that there exists an efficient algorithm for checking the validi-
ty of the challenge key pair(s) output by the adversary, i.e. if
(PK, S K) is a possible output of SetupUser.
Resolution Ambiguity. During an exchange, the verifier may
be unable to receive the signer’s full signature due to the poor
internet connection. In this case the verifier could ask the arbi-
trator to resolve the signer’s partial signature that it has already
received. If the full signature output by algorithm Res has a dif-
ferent structure from that output by algorithm Sig, it may bring
bad effect to the credit of the signer, as others may think the
signer was cheating in the exchange. To protect the interest of
the signer, we need resolution ambiguity1 in this case.
Resolution ambiguity requires that the ‘resolved signatures’,
e.g. Res(M,PSig(M, S Ki, PKi, PK j, APK), AS K, {PKi, PK j}),
output by the arbitrator should be (computationally) indistin-
guishable from the ‘actual signatures’ generated by the signer,
e.g. Sig(M, S Ki, PKi, PK j, APK). We stress that there are some
cases in which a signer who is unable or refuses to return its full
commitment, should be accounted, then the resolution ambigu-
ity is not required any more, i.e. the OFE scheme should be
accountable.
Signer Ambiguity. Informally, given a partial signature σP
from a signer A, a verifier B should not be able to convince
others that σP was generated by A. To capture this, we borrow
the idea of defining the ambiguity in concurrent signatures [12],
and require that B should be able to simulate partial signatures
that look indistinguishable from those generated by A. We need
the existence of a simulation algorithm FPSig, that takes as in-
put (M, S KB, PKA, PKB, APK) and outputs a partial signature
σP that is valid under PKA, PKB. This is also the reason why
a verifier should be equipped with a public/secret key pair, and
its public key should be included in the inputs of PSig and Sig.
Formally, we define an experiment in which D is a probabilistic
polynomial-time distinguisher.
PM← PMGen(1k)
(APK, AS K)← SetupTTP(PM)




PSig(M, S KA, PKA, PKB, APK) , if b = 0
FPSig(M, S KB, PKA, PKB, APK), if b = 1
b′ ← DORes (st, σP)
Succ. of D := [b′ = b∧
(M, σP, {PKA, PKB}) < Query(D,ORes)]
where st is the state information of D; oracle ORes takes as in-
put a valid partial signature σP of user Ui on message M with
respect to verifier U j, i.e. (M, σP, {PKi, PK j}), and outputs a
full signature σF on M under PKi, PK j; and Query(D,ORes)
is the set of valid queries that D issued to oracle ORes. The
advantage of D, denoted by AdvSAD (k), is defined as the gap be-
tween its success probability in the experiment above and 1/2,
i.e. AdvSAD (k) = |Pr[b′ = b] − 1/2|.
1Resolution ambiguity is the same as the ambiguity defined in [14, 26]. Here
we rename it in order to avoid any confusion, as we will define another kind of
ambiguity, e.g. signer ambiguity.
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Definition 2 (Signer Ambiguity). An AOFE scheme is signer
ambiguous if for any PPT algorithm D, AdvSAD (k) is negligible
in k.
Remark 1 : A similar notion introduced in [16, 30] requires
that the signer’s partial signature can be simulated in an indis-
tinguishable way. However, their ‘indistinguishability’ [16, 30]
is defined in the CPA fashion, i.e. the adversary has no oracle
access for resolving partial signatures; while our definition of
signer ambiguity is of CCA type, i.e. the adversary has access
to ORes.
We also remark that this level of signer ambiguity may be
the best that we can get. In Def. 2, D is required to output
well-formed key pairs for both A and B. If, for example, PKB
is maliciously chosen by D so that it is the hash of PKA, then
no one probably knows the corresponding secret key S KB, and
there is no way to ensure that the verifier can simulate the sign-
er’s partial signatures. As far as we know, the definition of
anonymity of ring signatures also imposes a similar require-
ment. In the definition of anonymity w.r.t. adversarially-chosen
keys and anonymity against full key exposure [6], the two tar-
get key pairs, (PKi0 , S Ki0 ) and (PKi1 , S Ki1 ), are required to be
well-formed/honestly generated. The difference is that the two
target key pairs in [6] are prepared by the challenger, while in
Def. 2 they are chosen by the distinguisher. It is readily seen
that our definition of signer ambiguity is stronger (or at least
not weaker).
Security Against Signers. It requires that no PPT adver-
sary A should be able to produce a partial signature with non-
negligible probability, which looks good to a verifier but cannot
be resolved to a full signature by the arbitrator. This ensures
the fairness for verifiers, that is, if the signer has committed to a
message w.r.t an (honest) verifier, the verifier should always be
able to get the signer’s full commitment. Formally, we consider
the following experiment:
PM← PMGen(1k)
(APK, AS K)← SetupTTP(PM)
(PKB, S KB)← SetupUser(PM, APK)
(M, σP, PKA)← AO
B
PSig,ORes (APK, PKB)
σF ← Res(M, σP, AS K, {PKA, PKB})
Succ. of A := [PVer(M, σP, {PKA, PKB}, APK) = 1∧
Ver(M, σF , PKA, PKB, APK) = 0∧
(M, PKA) < Query(A,OBPSig)]
where oracle ORes is described in the previous experiment; OBPSig
takes as input (M, PKi) and outputs a partial signature on M
valid under PKi, PKB generated using S KB; and Query(A,OBPSig)
is the set of queries made by A to oracle OBPSig. Note that the
adversary is not allowed to corrupt PKB; otherwise it can easily
succeed in the experiment by simply using S KB to produce a
partial signature under public keys PKA, PKB. The advantage
of A in the experiment, denoted by AdvSASA (k), is defined to be
A’s success probability.
Definition 3 (Security Against Signers). An AOFE scheme is
secure against signers if there is no PPT adversary A such that
AdvSASA (k) is non-negligible in k.
Security Against Verifiers. This security notion requires that
any PPT verifier B should not be able to transform a partial
signature into a full signature with non-negligible probability
if no help has been obtained from the signer or the arbitrator.
This requirement has some similarity to the notion of opacity
for verifiably encrypted signature [9]. Formally, we consider
the following experiment:
PM← PMGen(1k)
(APK, AS K)← SetupTTP(PM)
(PKA, S KA)← SetupUser(PM, APK)
(M, PKB, σF)← BOPSig,ORes (PKA, APK)
Succ. of B := [Ver(M, σF , PKA, PKB, APK) = 1∧
(M, ·, {PKA, PKB}) < Query(B,ORes)]
where oracle ORes is described in the experiment of signer am-
biguity, Query(B, ORes) is the set of valid queries B issued to
the resolution oracle ORes, and oracle OPSig takes as input a
message M and a public key PK j and returns a valid partial
signature σP on M under PKA, PK j generated using S KA. In
the experiment, B can ask the arbitrator for resolving any par-
tial signature with respect to any pair of public keys adaptively
chosen by B, with the limitation described in the experiment.
The advantage of B in the experiment, denoted by AdvSAVB (k), is
defined to be B’s success probability in the experiment above.
Definition 4 (Security Against Verifiers). An AOFE scheme is
secure against verifiers if there is no PPT adversary B such that
AdvSAVB (k) is non-negligible in k.
Security Against the Arbitrator. Intuitively, security against
the arbitrator requires that no PPT adversary C including the
arbitrator, should be able to generate with non-negligible prob-
ability a valid full signature without explicitly asking the signer
to do so. It ensures the fairness for signers, that is, no one can
frame the actual signer on a message with a forgery. Formally,
we consider the following experiment:
PM← PMGen(1k)
(APK, AS K∗)← C(PM)
(PKA, S KA)← SetupUser(PM, APK)
(M, PKB, σF)← COPSig (AS K∗, APK, PKA)
Succ. of C := [Ver(M, σF , PKA, PKB, APK) = 1∧
(M, PKB) < Query(C,OPSig)]
where the oracle OPSig is described in the previous experiment,
AS K∗ is C’s state information, which might not be the corre-
sponding private key of APK, and Query(C,OPSig) is the set of
queries C issued to the oracle OPSig. The advantage of C in this
experiment, denoted by AdvSAAC (k), is defined to be C’s success
probability.
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Definition 5 (Security Against the Arbitrator). An AOFE scheme
is said to be secure against the arbitrator if there is no PPT ad-
versary C such that AdvSAAC (k) is non-negligible in k.
Remark 2 : In AOFE, both signer A and verifier B are equipped
with public/secret key pairs (of the same structure), and both
of them can generate indistinguishable partial signatures on the
same message. If the security against the arbitrator holds for
A, it holds for B as well. That is, even when colluding with A
(and other signers), the arbitrator should not be able to frame B
for a full signature on a message, if it has not obtained a partial
signature on the message generated by B.
Definition 6 (Secure AOFE). An AOFE scheme is secure in
the multi-user setting and chosen-key model if it is resolution
ambiguous, signer ambiguous, secure against signers, secure
against verifiers and secure against the arbitrator.
2.2. Weak Variants of Security Models
Intuitively, if an AOFE scheme is not secure against veri-
fiers, the scheme cannot be signer ambiguous, because a mali-
cious verifier can convert a signer’s partial signature to a ful-
l one, which allows the verifier to win the signer ambiguity
game. For technical reasons, we first describe some weakened
models below. In the definition of signer ambiguity (Def. 2),
the two public/secret key pairs are selected by D. In a slight-
ly weaker variant, the two key pairs are selected by the chal-
lenger, and then given to D. This is comparable to the ambigu-
ity definition of concurrent signature [12], or the strongest def-
inition of anonymity of ring signature considered in [6], name-
ly anonymity against full key exposure. We can also define an
even weaker version of signer ambiguity, in which D is given
(PKA, PKB, S KB) and oracle access to OPSig. We call this vari-
ant the weak signer ambiguity.
In the definition of security against verifiers (Def. 4), the
verifier’s public key PKB is adaptively selected by the adversary
B. In a weaker variant, the challenger selects (PKB, S KB) and
gives the pair to B. The rest of the model remains unchanged.
We call this variant weak security against verifiers. Below we
show that if an AOFE scheme is weakly signer ambiguous and
secure against the arbitrator, then it is weakly secure against
verifiers.
Theorem 1. In AOFE, weak signer ambiguity and security a-
gainst the arbitrator (Def. 5) together imply weak security a-
gainst verifiers.
Proof. Suppose that an AOFE scheme is not weakly secure
against verifiers. Let B be the PPT adversary that has non-
negligible advantage ϵ in the experiment of weak security a-
gainst verifiers after making at most q queries of the form (·, PKB)
to oracle OPSig. By the security against the arbitrator, with over-
whelming probability B has queried OPSig in the form (·, PKB).
Hence the value of q is at least one.
Denote the experiment of weak security against verifiers by
Ex(0). Note that in Ex(0) all queries to OPSig are answered with
partial signatures generated using S KA. We now define a se-
ries of experiments, Ex(1), · · · ,Ex(q), so that Ex(i) (i ≥ 1) is the
same as Ex(i−1) except that the (q + 1 − i)-th, · · · , q-th queries
of the form (·, PKB) submitted to OPSig are answered with par-
tial signatures generated using S KB. Let B’s success probabil-
ity in Ex(i) be ϵi. Note that ϵ0 = ϵ, and in Ex(q) all queries
(·, PKB) to OPSig are answered with partial signatures generated
using S KB. Since B also knows S KB (via corruption), it can
use S KB to generate partial signatures using S KB on any mes-
sage. Therefore, making queries (·, PKB) to OPSig does not help
B on winning the experiment if the answers are generated using
S KB. It is equivalent to the case that B does not issue any query
(·, PKB) to OPSig. Hence guaranteed by the security against the
arbitrator, we have that B’s advantage in Ex(q) is negligible as B
has to output a full signature without getting any corresponding
partial signature.
The non-negligible gap, ϵ0 − ϵq, between B’s advantage in
Ex(0) and that in Ex(q) translates into a non-negligible gap be-
tween B’s advantage in a pair of neighboring hybrid experi-
ments. We construct a PPT algorithm D that uses B as a sub-
routine to break the weak signer ambiguity.
Given (APK, PKA, PKB, S KB), algorithm D selects i uni-
formly from {1, · · · , q}, invokes B on input (APK, PKA, PKB,
S KB), and then simulates the oracles for B. The oracle ORes
is simulated by D using its own resolution oracle. If B makes
a query (M, PK j) to OPSig where PK j , PKB, D forwards this
query to its own partial signing oracle, and returns the obtained
answer back to B. Now consider the ℓ-th query of the form
(M, PKB) made by B to OPSig. If ℓ < q + 1 − i, D forwards it to
its own oracle, and returns the obtained answer. If ℓ = q+ 1− i,
D requests its challenger for the challenge partial signature σ∗P
on M and returns the obtained signature to B. If ℓ > q + 1 − i,
D simply uses S KB to produce a partial signature on M. At the
end of the simluation, when B outputs (M∗, σ∗F). If B succeeds
in the experiment, D outputs b′ = 0; otherwise, D outputs a
random bit b′.
If D’s challenger uses S KA and follows PSig algorithm to
produce σ∗P, i.e. b = 0, the view of B is identical to that in
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FPSig to produce σ∗P, i.e. b = 1, the view of B is identical to













Denote by Pr[b′ = 0|b = 0] (resp. Pr[b′ = 0|b = 1]) the
probability that D outputs b′ = 0 when σ∗P is output by algorith-
m Sig (resp. FPSig). Since the index i is uniformly distributed
in {1, · · · , q}, we have that


























































which is non-negligibly larger than 12 since q is polynomial in
the security parameter. This contradicts with the weak signer
ambiguity assumption.
Corollary 1. In AOFE, signer ambiguity (Def. 2) and securi-
ty against the arbitrator (Def. 5) together imply weak security
against verifiers.
Letting an adversary select the two challenge public keys
gives the adversary more power in attacking signer ambigui-
ty. Therefore, signer ambiguity defined in Sec. 2.1 is at least
as strong as the weak signer ambiguity. Hence this corollary
follows the theorem above directly.
3. Previous Constructions Revisited
In this section we first analyze the extension of two generic
constructions to AOFE, and show that the resulting schemes are
actually insecure under our proposed security model.
3.1. The First Try
In [26] Huang et al. provided a simple and straightfor-
ward method in constructing efficient optimistic fair exchange
schemes. In their proposal, each user has two key pairs, one for
public key signature, and the other for ring signature. The par-
tial signature of a user consists of only a (standard) signature
on the message, while the full signature includes additionally
a ring signature under the ring consisting of the signer and the
arbitrator.
The main difference between OFE and AOFE is that in ad-
dition to all the security properties of OFE, AOFE also enjoys
signer ambiguity. A natural way to extend their method in
the construction of AOFE is to use two ring signatures in the
scheme, i.e. the partial signature consists of a ring signature
on M under the ring of the signer and the verifier, and the full
signature includes additionally a ring signature on M under the
ring of the signer and the arbitrator.
(Insecurity): It seems that we achieve signer ambiguity via this
method, due to the anonymity of the underlying ring signature
scheme. However, this construction is insecure against the ar-
bitrator. That is, the arbitrator can frame any signer on any
message without asking the signer to sign any message. To do
this, the arbitrator C colludes with a verifier U j, and selects a
target user Ui and a target message M. U j generates a partial
signature σP on M with regard to the group {Ui,U j}, and claims
that σP was generated by Ui. Then C resolves it to σF by pro-
ducing a ring signature under the ring {C,Ui}. The two rings
intersect at Ui, and thus σF is binding to Ui.
3.2. The Second Try
In [14] Dodis et al. revisited a generic construction of op-
timistic fair exchange. Roughly, the partial signature of a user
includes an encryption c of his signature σ on the message M
generated under the arbitrator’s public key, and an NIZK proof
π showing that c contains the user’s signature on M. The us-
er’s full signature on M is σ. They showed that this generic
construction is a secure OFE scheme in the multi-user setting
(under the certified-key model).
One may trivially extends this scheme to AOFE. Namely,
the NIZK proof shows that c contains either the signer’s signa-
ture on M or the verifier’s signature on M, using the signature
and the randomness for the encryption as the witness. This may
seem to be a secure AOFE scheme. Namely, the NIZK proof
shows the membership of the following language:
L =
{
((pkTA, PKi, PK j, c,M), (σ, r)) :
c = E.Enc(pkTA, σ; r) ∧
(S.Ver(PKi, σ,M) = 1
∨ S.Ver(PK j, σ,M) = 1
)}
where pkTA is the public key of the arbitrator, E is the encryp-
tion scheme and S is the signature scheme. However, the fol-
lowing attack demonstrates that it is actually insecure under the
security model proposed in Sec. 2.1.
(The Attack): We consider the security against the arbitrator
(see Def. 5). Let C be an adversary. Given the challenge public
key PKA, C randomly selects a message M, and generates two
public keys, say, PKB, PKD. Then it asks the oracle OPSig to
sign M w.r.t. PKD, and obtains a ciphertext c, and an NIZK
proof πAD showing that c contains a signature generated by ei-
ther user A or user D. C then uses the arbitrator’s secret key
to recover user A’s signature σ, and re-encrypts σ under the
arbitrator’s public key using a fresh randomness r′. Let the
new ciphertext be c′. Finally, the adversary produces a new
NIZK proof πAB showing that c′ is an encryption of a signa-
ture on M generated by either A or B, using σ, r′ as the wit-
ness. By the validity of (c, πAD), we can easily get that (c′, πAB)
is also a valid output. Note that in the whole attack C did-
n’t submit (M, PKB) to the oracle OPSig. Thus, the security a-
gainst the arbitrator breaks. However, it’s not hard to prove that
this generic construction is secure against the arbitrator under
a weaker model which differs from the one described in Sec.
2.1 only in that it’s required (M, ·) < Query(C,OPSig) instead of
(M, PKB) < Query(C,OPSig). This weak security against the ar-
bitrator is guaranteed by the unforgeability (EUF-CMA) of the
underlying signature scheme.
From the attacks above, we learn that constructing a se-
cure AOFE scheme is not a trivial task. The introduction of
signer ambiguity to OFE makes the security against the arbitra-
tor more subtle. Besides, the security against the arbitrator of
AOFE seems to be stronger than that of OFE defined in [14, 26].
However, they in fact are not comparable. In the model consid-
ered in this paper, the public key of the verifier is involved in
the generation of a partial signature, thus every query the ad-
versary submits to oracles includes an additional public key;
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while this is not the case in the model of OFE. In the security a-
gainst the arbitrator (Def. 5), the adversary is allowed to obtain
the signer’s signature on M (but with respect to any public key
rather than PKB). This is similar with the strong unforgeability
of digital signatures [19].
4. Our Generic Construction
Now we propose a generic construction of AOFE in the s-
tandard model, which is similar with the one widely used in
building OFE schemes. Namely, the signer’s signature is en-
crypted under the arbitrator’s public key, and then a non-interactive
proof is given to show that the ciphertext contains the signer’s
signature on the message. As pointed by Boyd et al. [10], the
non-interactive proof is not much different from the signer’s
signature, as it’s also sufficient to prove to others that the signer
is bound to the message. Since AOFE requires that a verifier
cannot prove to others that the signer is bound to a message, in
the generic construction the signer has the verifier involved in
the proof. That is, the signer provides a non-interactive proof
showing that the ciphertext contains either the signer’s signa-
ture or the verifier’s signature on the message.
4.1. The Proposal
Let S = (Kg,Sig,Ver) be a public key signature scheme
that is weakly existentially unforgeable under chosen message
attacks [7, 19], and OTS = (Kg,Sig,Ver) be a strong one-time
signature scheme. Let E = (Kg,Enc,Dec) be a tag-based public
key encryption scheme that is selective-tag weakly CCA secure,
and Π = (Kg,Prv,Ver, (Sim1,Sim2)) be a NIZK proof system
for the following language:
L =
{
((pkTA, PKi, PK j, c, tag,M), (σ, r)) :
c = E.Enc(pkTA, tag, σ; r) ∧
(S.Ver(PKi, σ,M) = 1
∨ S.Ver(PK j, σ,M) = 1
)}
.
Algorithm Π.Kg takes as input 1k and outputs a common ref-
erence string crs. Prv and Ver are the prover strategy and
verification algorithm respectively. (Sim1, Sim2) is the sim-
ulator, where Sim1 takes as input 1k and outputs a simulated
common reference string crs that’s indistinguishable from a
real one, along with the corresponding trapdoor τS , and Sim2
takes as input (crs, τS , x) and outputs a non-interactive proof
whose distribution is indistinguishable from that of proofs out-
put by the prover. Note that the membership of the language
above is efficiently checkable, so we have that L ∈ NP. Fig-
ure 1 (on page 9) describes our generic construction of AOFE,
named GAOFE.
Note that in Figure 1 (page 9) we omit the description of
the parameter generation algorithm just for simplicity. This al-
gorithm simply calls the corresponding parameter generation
algorithms of the encryption scheme and the signature scheme
to generate their parameters, which will be used in the other
algorithms of GAOFE.
Remark 3 : Note that in the construction, the public keys of
both the signer and the verifier, i.e. PKi and PK j, are included
in the message to be signed of the one-time signature δ. This is
important, as otherwise the scheme would be vulnerable to an
attack which compromises the security against signers. Specif-
ically, the signer Alice runs as the verifier an execution of the
protocol with Bob. After obtaining Bob’s partial signature σP,B,
Alice aborts this execution, and then restarts a new execution as
the signer with Bob. She sends σP,B as her partial signature
to Bob. As σP,B is a valid signature with regard to the group
consisting of Alice and Bob, and the partial signature doesn’t
specify who the signer is and who the receiver is, Bob would
view it as a valid one, and then returns his full signature. At
this time, Alice aborts this execution again. Bob then resorts to
the arbitrator for resolving σP,B to a full one. However, since it
was originally generated by Bob himself, the arbitrator can on-
ly resolve it to Bob’s full signature. So in this case, Bob cannot
get Alice’s full signature, and thus the security against signers
is broken. Therefore, it seems necessary to specify in the mes-
sage to be signed the identities of the signer and the verifier.
Besides the validity check of the partial signature, the verifier
should also check if the public key of the receiver specified in
the signature, i.e. PK j, is his. If not, it should reject. However,
the inclusion of public keys doesn’t contradict the signer am-
biguity. The embedding of PKi and PK j to the message to be
signed doesn’t require any private information, and anyone can
do it. The verifier is still able to use his secret key to produce
indistinguishable partial signatures. We also note that the attack
above does not happen in ordinary OFE at all. Thus, this attack
shows a big difference between AOFE and OFE.
4.2. Security Analysis
Theorem 2. GAOFE is a secure ambiguous optimistic fair ex-
change scheme.
The theorem follows the following lemmas directly:
Lemma 1. GAOFE is resolution ambiguous.
Proof. Guaranteed by the security against signers (as shown in
Lemma 3), if a partial signature σP is valid, then with over-
whelming probability that the arbitrator can extract the signer’s
signature σ on the message. Conditioned on that the resolution
succeeds, the signature output by the arbitrator is the same as
that output by the signer. Therefore, the distribution of the out-
put by the arbitrator is indistinguishable from that of the sign-
er’s signatures. So the construction above is resolution ambigu-
ous.
Lemma 2. GAOFE is signer ambiguous.
Before presenting the proof, we describe how the simulation
algorithm FPSig works. To simulate a partial signature on M,
the verifier U j generates a fresh one-time key pair (otvk, otsk)
and uses its own secret key S K j to generate its signature σ on
otvk. The rest remains the same as algorithm PSig.
Proof. Let D be a PPT adversary against the security against
verifiers. We modify the experiment so that the challenger runs
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• SetupTTP: Given PM, the arbitrator runs E.Kg(1k) to generate a key pair, (pkTA, skTA), and invokes Π.Kg(1k) to produce a
common reference string. It publishes APK = (pkTA, crs) and stores AS K = skTA secretly.
• SetupUser: Each user Ui runs S.Kg(1k) to generate a key pair for the signature scheme, (pki, ski), and publishes PKi = pki
and stores S Ki = ski.
• PSig: To partially sign a message M with verifier U j, the user Ui does the following.
– Generate a new pair of one-time key for OTS, i.e. (otvk, otsk)← OTS.Kg(1k).
– Compute a signature σ on otvk, i.e. σ← S.Sig(S Ki, otvk).
– Encrypt the signature under the arbitrator’s public key using randomness r with respect to tag otvk, i.e. c ←
E.Enc(pkTA, otvk, σ; r).
– Produce an NIZK proof π using witness (σ, r), i.e.
π← Π.Prv(crs, (pkTA, PKi, PK j, c, otvk, otvk), (σ, r)).
– Sign the ciphertext, the proof and the message using otsk, i.e.
δ← OTS.Sig(otsk, c∥π∥M∥PKi∥PK j).
The parital signature σP is composed of (c, π, δ, otvk).
• PVer: On receiving Ui’s partial signature σP = (c, π, δ, otvk) on message M, user U j checks if
OTS.Ver(otvk, δ, c∥π∥M∥PKi∥PK j) = 1 and Π.Ver(crs, (pkTA, PKi, PK j, c, otvk, otvk), π) = 1. If either fails, it reject-
s; otherwise, it accepts.
• Sig: To sign a message M with verifier U j, user Ui first computes a partial signature σP = (c, π, δ, otvk) as above, and then
sets its full signature to be σF = (σ,σP).
• Ver: On receiving Ui’s full signature σF = (σ, (c, π, δ, otvk)) on message M, the verifier first checks if
PVer(M, (c, π, δ, otvk), {PKi, PK j}, APK) = 1 and S.Ver(pki, σ, otvk) = 1. If either fails, it outputs 0 (reject); otherwise,
it outputs 1 (accept).
• Res: On receiving from U j a partial signature σP = (c, π, δ, otvk) claimed to be generated by Ui, the arbitrator checks the
validity of σP by calling algorithm PVer. If it’s invalid, it returns ⊥ to U j. Otherwise, it recovers σ from c by computing
σ← E.Dec(skTA, otvk, c). If S.Ver(PKi, σ, otvk) = 1, the arbitrator returns σ to U j; otherwise, it returns ⊥.
Figure 1: Our Generic Construction of AOFE, GAOFE
Π.Sim1 algorithm to generate the common reference string crs
along with a simulation trapdoor τS . By the common reference
string indistinguishability of Π, D’s advantage in new experi-
ment is negligibly close to that in the original experiment.
Second, we modify the experiment so that to answer each
query the adversary submits to OPSig and to prepare the chal-
lenge partial signature, the challenger calls Π.Sim2 on input
τS to produce the proof π, instead of calling the prover strat-
egy with the witness (σ, r). Guaranteed by the zero-knowledge
property of Π, this modification brings only a negligible differ-
ence to D’s advantage.
Third, the experiment is modified again so that for each
valid query submitted by the adversary to oracle ORes, i.e. (M,
σP, {PKi, PK j}) where σP = (c, π, δ, otvk), if otvk was ever used
by OPSig in answering B’s partial signing query, i.e. (M′, PK′)
is the query and σ′ = (c′, π′, δ′, otvk) is the answer, but (c, π,M,
{PKi, PK j}, δ) , (c′, π′,M′, {PKA, PK′}, δ′), the experiment is
aborted. As will be discussed in the proof of Lemma 5, this case
happens with negligible probability, guaranteed by the strong
one-time unforgeability of OTS. Hence, D’s advantage does
not change noticeably.
Assume that D can win this experiment with non-negligible
advantage ϵD, we then use it to build another PPT algorithm D′
to break the selective-tag CCA security of E, as below.
D′ first calls OTS.Kg(1k) to generate a one-time key pair
(otvk∗, otsk∗), and submits otvk∗ to its challenger as the chal-
lenge tag, which then returns a public key pk of E. D′ runs
Π.Sim1(1k) to generate (crs, τS ), and calls S.Kg(1k) to gen-
erate a key pair for the honest user UA, say, (PKA, S KA). It
invokes D on input (APK, PKA) = ((pk, crs), PKA), and then
begins to simulate oracle ORes for D.
Given a query (M, σP, {PKi, PK j}) whereσP = (c, π, δ, otvk),
D′ first checks if the query passes the PVer algorithm. If not,
it returns ⊥ to D; otherwise, the soundness of Π implies that c
contains a valid signature σ on otvk with respect to either PKi
or PK j. D′ forwards the ciphertext c and the tag otvk to its
own decryption oracle, and obtains σ. If either S.Ver(PKi, σ,
otvk) = 1 or S.Ver(PK j, σ, otvk) = 1 holds, D′ returns σ to D.
At some time, D submits (M∗, (PKA, S KA), (PKB, S KB)).
D′ first checks if both the key pairs are valid. If not, D aborts
and outputs a random bit. Otherwise, it does the following:
1. Run S.Sig twice to generate signatures σ0, σ1 on otvk∗
using S KA, S KB respectively.
2. Submit σ0, σ1 to its own challenger, which returns a ci-
phertext c∗ of σb with respect to tag otvk∗ for some ran-
dom bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
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3. Call the simulator Π.Sim2 on input the trapdoor τS to
generate a proof π∗ for (pk, PKA, PKB, c∗, otvk∗).
4. Use otsk∗ to compute a one-time signature δ∗ on c∗∥π∗∥M∗
∥ PKA∥PKB.
The challenge signature prepared by D′ isσ∗P = (c
∗, π∗, δ∗, otvk∗).
If b = 0, σ∗P is a valid partial signature output by algorithm
PSig; otherwise, σ∗ is a simulated partial signature output by
algorithm FPSig.
D′ returns σ∗P to the adversary, and then continues to simu-
late the oracle ORes. Let (M, σP, {PKi, PK j}) be any of its valid
queries, where σP = (c, π, δ, otvk). We distinguish the follow-
ing two cases:
1. otvk , otvk∗. In this case, D′ simulates ORes in the same
way as above.
2. otvk = otvk∗. We say, this case will not happen in the ex-
periment. First of all, we can exclude the subcase (c∗∥π∗∥
M∗∥PKA∥PKB, δ∗) = (c∥π∥M∥PKi∥ PK j, δ), because the
adversary is prohibited from asking ORes for resolving
(M∗, σ∗P, {PKA, PKB}). On the other hand, if (c∗∥π∗∥M∗∥
PKA∥PKB, δ∗) , (c∥π∥M∥PKi∥PK j, δ), according to the
experiment’s specification, the experiment is aborted.
Finally, A outputs a bit d. D then outputs a bit b′ = d and halts.
It’s readily seen that the oracle ORes is simulated indistin-
guishably by D′. If D succeeds in the experiment, D′ also suc-
ceeds in outputting the bit b′. So D’s advantage is
AdvT-PKED′ (k) ≥ AdvSAD (k) = ϵD
which is non-negligible by hypothesis. Therefore, the selective-
tag CCA security of E is broken.
Lemma 3. GAOFE is secure against signers.
Proof. If a partial signature (c, π, δ, otvk) of UA is valid on mes-
sage M with respect to verifier UB, by the soundness of Π and
the perfect completeness of E, with overwhelming probability
the arbitrator can recover from the ciphertext c a valid signature
σ on M generated by either UA or UB. On the other hand, due
to the security against the arbitrator (as shown in Lemma 5), we
know that only with negligible probability can the adversary A
forge a signature on behalf of an honest user UB. Therefore,
the valid signature must be generated by the adversary itself.
Hence, the adversary can only break the security against sign-
ers with negligible probability.
Lemma 4. GAOFE is secure against verifiers.
Proof. Let B be an efficient adversary against the security a-
gainst verifiers. Let P be the set of partial signatures returned
by the oracle OPSig, and let (M∗, PKB, σ∗F) be B’s final output,
where σ∗F = (σ
∗
P, σ
∗). First of all, we modify the experiment so
that if σ∗P < P, we abort it. Guaranteed by the security against
the arbitrator (shown in Lemma 5), the modification leads to
only a negligible difference in B’s success probability.
Second, we modify the experiment so that the challenger
runsΠ.Sim1 algorithm to generate the common reference string
crs along with a simulation trapdoor τS , and to answer each
query the adversary submits to OPSig the challenger callsΠ.Sim2
with τS to produce the proof π, instead of calling the prover s-
trategy with the witness (σ, r). By the zero knowledge property
of Π, we know that the modification brings a negligible differ-
ence to B’s success probability.
Third, the experiment is modified again so that for each
valid query submitted by the adversary to oracle ORes, i.e. (M,
σP, {PKi, PK j}) where σP = (c, π, δ, otvk), if otvk was ever used
by OPSig in answering B’s partial signing query, i.e. (M′, PK′)
is the query and σ′ = (c′, π′, δ′, otvk) is the answer, but (c, π,M,
{PKi, PK j}, δ) , (c′, π′,M′, {PKA, PK′}, δ′), the experiment is
aborted. If the case happens, obviously, it indicates that the
adversary produces a forgery for the signature scheme OTS.
Guaranteed by the strong one-time unforgeability of OTS, we
have that the modification affects B’s success probability negli-
gibly as well.
Next we show that B’s success probability in this experi-
ment, say, ϵB, is negligible in k. Assume that ϵB is non-negligible,
we then use B to build another PPT algorithm D to break the
selective-tag CCA security of E.
D first invokes the algorithm S.Kg(1k) to generate a pair of
one-time key, (otvk∗, otvk∗), submits otvk∗ to its challenger as
the target tag, and receives a challenge public key pk of E from
the challenger. It runs Π.Sim1(1k) to generate (crs, τS ), and
calls S.Kg to generate (PKA, S KA). Suppose that B will submit
at most q distinct query to oracle OPSig, which is polynomial
in the security parameter. D picks i at random from the set
{1, · · · , q}, and sets pkTA = pk, APK = (crs, pkTA). It invokes
B on input (APK, PKA), and then begins to simulate oracles for
B as follows.
• ORes: On input a resolution query, (M, σP, PKi, PK j), D
first checks the validity of the query, and returns ⊥ if it
doesn’t pass the PVer algorithm. It asks its decryption o-
racle to decrypt c with respect to tag otvk, and receives
σ from it. D returns σ if S.Ver(PKi, σ, otvk) = 1 or
S.Ver(PK j, σ, otvk) = 1.
• OPSig: Let (M, PK′) be the j-th distinct query B submits
to the oracle. If j , i, this query is dealt with by D like a
real user. If j = i, D computes σ∗ ← S.Sig(S KA, otvk∗).
It sets σ0 = σ∗ and randomly selects σ1 from the range
ofS.Sig(·, ·), and forwardsσ0, σ1 to its challenger, which
randomly chooses one of them say, σb for some bit b ∈
{0, 1}, to encrypt. Let the ciphertext be c∗. D then call-
s algorithm Π.Sim2 with the simulation trapdoor τS to
produce a proof π∗ on (pkTA, PKA, PK′, c∗, otvk∗, otvk∗).
It then completes the generation of the partial signature
by computing δ∗ = OTS.Sig(otsk∗, c∗∥π∗∥M∥ PKA∥PK′),
and returns σ∗P = (c
∗, π∗, δ∗, otvk∗) back to the adversary
B.






output doesn’t satisfy the winning condition, D aborts and out-
puts a random bit. By the specification of the experiment, we
know that σ∗P ∈ P. If (M∗, PKB) is not the i-th distinct query to
oracle OPSig, alternatively, D’s guess of i is incorrect, D aborts
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and outputs a random bit. If Ver(M∗, σ∗F , PKA, PKB, APK) = 1,
D outputs 0; otherwise, it outputs 1.
We now consider the simulation of oracles ORes and OPSig.
Let (M, σP = (c, π, δ, otvk), {PKi, PK j}) be a valid query to
ORes. If c , c∗, D can handle this query as above. We then
focus on the other case, c = c∗.
• If otvk , otvk∗, D can simply forward (otvk, c∗) to it-
s decryption oracle as the tag otvk is different from the
challenge one, otvk∗, and obtain the signature σ.
• If otvk = otvk∗, D is not allowed to ask its oracle to de-
crypt c∗ with respect to otvk∗. However, as discussed in
the proof of Lemma 2, this case will not happen.
Regarding the oracle OPSig, it’s perfectly simulated when
j , i. For j = i, if c∗ is an encryption of σ0, the view of B is
identical to that in a real attack, and B will succeed in the exper-
iment with probability ϵB, which is non-negligible. If c∗ is an
encryption of σ1, the view of the adversary is indistinguishable
from that in a real attack, due to the zero knowledge property of
Π. Since c∗ is independent of PKA, and thus provides no help
to B in generating σ∗F . In this case, if B successfully produces a
valid full signatureσ∗F , it should be that B forges a full signature
on behalf of the honest user UA, thus breaking the security a-
gainst arbitrator. As shown in Lemma 5, B’s success probability
in this case is negligible.
Let b′ be the bit that D outputs. We want to show that
|Pr[b′ = 1 ∧ b = 1] − Pr[b′ = 0 ∧ b = 1]| is non-negligible
in k. No matter b = 0 or b = 1, the probability that D aborts
due to an incorrect guess of i is the same, and when it aborts, it
outputs 0 with probability exactly one-half. Therefore, we only
need to focus on the case in which D guesses i correctly, which
happens with probability 1/q. Denote this event by Corr.
If b = 0, as we discussed above, the probability that B out-
puts a valid σ∗F is ϵB. Thus, D outputs 0 with probability at least
ϵB. On the other side, i.e. b = 1, as discussed above, the prob-
ability that D outputs 0 is ε, which is the maximum probability
that an efficient can break the security against the arbitrator, and
is negligible. So we get the following:
AdvT−PKED (k) =
∣∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b] − 12
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b ∧ Corr] + Pr[b′ = b ∧ ¬Corr] − 12
∣∣∣∣∣
=







Pr[b′ = 0|b = 0 ∧ Corr]+
1
2



















which is also non-negligible. Therefore, the selective-tag CCA
security of E is broken.
Lemma 5. GAOFE is secure against the arbitrator.
Proof. Let C be a PPT adversary C which breaks the securi-
ty against the arbitrator, and (M∗, σ∗F , PKB) be its final output,
where σ∗F = (σ
∗
P, σ
∗) and σ∗P = (c
∗, π∗, δ∗, otvk∗). We distin-
guish the following two cases.
1. otvk∗ never appeared in oracle OPSig’s answers. In this
case, we can use C’s capability to build a PPT adversary
F0 to break the weak unforgeability of S.
Suppose that C issues at most q distinct queries to oracle
OPSig. F0 runs S.Kg(1k) q times to generate q one-time
key pairs, say, (otvk1, otvk1), · · · , (otvkq, otskq). It sub-
mits {otvk1, · · · , otvkq} to its challenger, which then re-
turns a public key pk and the corresponding signatures,
{σ1, · · · , σq}. F0 then invokes C on input 1k, which re-
turns a public key of the arbitrator, APK = (pkTA, crs).
F0 then returns PKA = pk to C, and begins to simulate the
partial signing oracle OPSig for C. On input the i-th dis-
tinct query (M, PK ji ), F0 chooses a random string r from
the randomness space of E, uses r to encrypt σi under
pkTA with respect to the tag otvki, and uses (σi, r) as the
witness to compute a NIZK proof π. F0 runs OTS.Sig
with secret key otski to generate a one-time signature δ
on c∥π∥M∥PKA∥PK ji . It returns (c, π, δ, otvki) to C. It’s
readily seen that the simulation of OPSig is perfect.




otvk∗), σ∗), and wins the experiment with non-negligible
probability ϵC . F0 outputs (otvk∗, σ∗). By the validity of
C’s output, we know that S.Ver(pk, σ∗, otvk∗) = 1. Since
otvk∗ is fresh, i.e., otvk∗ < {otvk1, · · · , otvkq}, F0 didn’t
ask its signing oracle to return a signature on otvk∗. Thus,
(otvk∗, σ∗) is a valid forgery for S. Therefore, F0 breaks
the security of S with probability at least the same as C.
2. otvk∗ appeared in one of OPSig’s answers to C’s partial
signing queries. Again, we assume that C issues at most
q queries to OPSig, which is polynomial in k. We use C to
build an algorithm F1 to break the security of OTS.
Given a public key otvk∗ of OTS and a one-time sign-
ing oracle, F1 invokes C on input 1k and obtains APK =
(pkTA, crs) from it. It then calls S.Kg(1k) to generate a
key pair for user A, say, (PKA, S KA), and randomly s-
elects i from {1, · · · , q}. F1 gives PKA to C, and then
begins to simulate oracle OPSig for it.
If j , i, F1 simulates the oracle like an honest user
UA does. If j = i, it uses S KA to generate a signature
σ on otvk∗, selects a random string r, computes c ←
E.Enc(pkTA, otvk∗, σ; r) and uses (σ, r) as the witness to
produce a NIZK proof π. F1 then submits c∥π∥M∥PKA∥PKi
to its signing oracle, and obtains a signature δ∗. It then
returns (c, π, δ, otvk∗) back to C.






and σ∗P = (c
∗, π∗, δ∗, otvk∗). F1 outputs (c∗∥π∗∥M∗∥PKA
∥PKB, δ∗). Assume that C wins the experiment. So we
have that OTS.Ver(otvk∗, δ∗, c∗∥π∗∥ M∗∥PKA∥PKB) = 1
and C didn’t issue a query on input (M∗, PKB). Since the
pair (M∗, PKB) is fresh, we have that
c∗∥π∗∥M∗∥PKA∥PKB , c∥π∥M∥PKA∥PKi.
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So δ∗ is a valid signature on a new message. Therefore,
the security of OTS is broken.
Since we do not know which of the two cases above will hap-
pen, we simply toss a coin b, and run the algorithm Fb. Still,
we have non-negligible probability to break the security of ei-
ther S or OTS, if C wins its experiment with non-negligible
probability.
Remark 4 : In our construction, the signer uses its secret key to
generate a signature on a fresh one-time verification key, while
the message is signed using the corresponding one-time signing
key. As shown by Huang et al. in [19], this combination leads
to a strongly unforgeable signature scheme. It’s not hard to see
that our proposed AOFE scheme actually achieves a stronger
version of security against the arbitrator. That is, even if the
adversary sees the signer UA’s full signature σF on a message
M with verifier UB, it cannot produce another full signature on
M, say, σ′F , such that Ver(M, σ
′
F , PKA, PKB, APK) = 1. The
claim can be shown using the proof given above without much
modification.
5. A Concrete Scheme without Random Oracles
In this section, we propose an AOFE scheme, which is based
on Groth and Sahai’s idea of constructing a fully anonymous
group signature scheme [17, 18]. Before describing the scheme,
we first introduce the assumptions and building tools used in
our construction.
5.1. Assumptions
(Admissible Pairing): Let G1 and GT be two cyclic group-
s of large prime order p. ê is an admissible pairing if ê :
G1 × G1 → GT is a map with the following properties: (1)Bi-
linearity: ∀R, S ∈ G1 and ∀a, b ∈ Z, ê(Ra, S b) = ê(R, S )ab;
(2) Non-degeneracy: ∃R, S ∈ G1 such that ê(R, S ) , 1; and (3)
Computability: there exists an efficient algorithm for computing
ê(R, S ) for any R, S ∈ G1.
(Decision Linear Assumption (DLIN)[8]): Let G1 be a cyclic
group of large prime order p. The Decision Linear Assumption
for G1 holds if for any PPT adversary A, the following proba-
bility is negligibly close to 1/2:
Pr
[
F,H,W ← G1; r, s← Zp; Z0 ← Wr+s; Z1 ← G1;
d ← {0, 1} : A(F,H,W, Fr,Hs,Zd) = d
]
.
(Strong Diffie-Hellman Assumption (SDH) [7]): The q-SDH
problem in G1 is defined as follows: given a (q+1)-tuple (g, gx,
gx
2
, · · · , gxq ), output a pair (g1/(x+c), c) where c ∈ Z∗p. The q-
SDH assumption holds if for any PPT adversaryA, the follow-
ing probability is negligible:
Pr
[








(Tag-based Encryption Scheme): We use a tag-based public
key encryption scheme E with security based on the DLIN as-
sumption reviewed above. Below is a brief review of a suitable
scheme due to Kiltz [28].
Key Generation: (pk, sk) = ((F,H,K, L), (κ, λ)) ← E.K(p,G1,
GT , ê, g), where F = gκ and H = gλ;
Encryption: Let M ∈ G1 be a message, tag ∈ Zp a tag, and
r, s ∈ Zp the randomness. The ciphertext y is computed as
y = (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5) = (Fr,Hs,M · gr+s, (gtagK)r, (gtagL)s);
Decryption: The validity of a ciphertext can be checked with-
out knowing the secret key. Anyone can check if ê(F, y4) =
ê(y1, gtagK) and ê(H, y5) = ê(y2, gtagL). If any one fails, ⊥
is returned. Otherwise, M is recovered by computing M =
y3 · y−1/κ1 · y
−1/λ
2 .
Note that the plaintext can also be recovered if the dis-
crete logarithms of K and L with respect to g are known. As-
sume that K = gκ
′
and L = gλ
′
. After checking the validi-





5 . Kiltz proved [28] that under the DLIN
assumption, the tag-based encryption scheme is selective-tag
weakly chosen-ciphertext secure, that is, an adversary A can-
not tell which message was encrypted under tag∗ (selected by
A though) before seeing the public key, even when it has ac-
cess to a decryption oracle that decrypts ciphertexts under any
tag other than tag∗. Readers may refer to [28] for the definition
of selective-tag weakly CCA security.
(Non-interactive Proofs): Recently, Groth and Sahai [18] pro-
posed a general methodology for constructing simple and ef-
ficient non-interactive witness indistinguishable (NIWI) proofs
and non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs that work
for bilinear groups, without requiring complex NP-reductions.
They proposed efficient non-interactive (NI) proofs for a set of
equations in a bilinear group (p,G1,GT , ê, g) over variables in
G1 and Zp, such as pairing products, i.e. ê(x1, y1) · ê(x2, y2) =
T , or multi-exponentiations, i.e. xδ11 x
δ2
2 = 1, having solution-
s xi ∈ G1, δ j ∈ Zp, so that all equations are simultaneously
satisfied. Their NI proofs can be based on subgroup decision
assumption, (symmetric) external Diffie-Hellman ((S)XDH) as-
sumption, and decision linear (DLIN) assumption. In our con-
struction, we will use their DLIN-based technique.
(Commitment Scheme): The Groth-Sahai’s DLIN-based proof-
s consists of two commitment schemes, one for committing to
variables of G1, and the other one to variables in Zp. The com-
mon reference string for either of the two schemes, can be gen-
erated in either of two indistinguishable ways.
For the first commitment scheme, a real common reference
string is set up to U = FR, V = HS , and W = gR+S , a commit-
ment to a variable x ∈ G1 can be respectively expressed as c =
(c1, c2, c3) = (FrU t,HsV t, gr+sW t x) for randomness r, s ∈ Zp.
The key for extracting x from c is xk = (κ, λ) = (logg F, logg H),
so the scheme is perfectly binding. A simulated common ref-
erence string consists of F,H, U = FR,V = HS and W = gT
where T , R + S , and thus the scheme is also perfectly hiding.
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For the commitment to a variable δ ∈ Zp, a real common
reference string consists of F,H, U′ = FR
′
, V ′ = HS
′
and
W ′ = gT
′
where T ′ , R′ + S ′, and a commitment to δ is ex-









for randomness r′, s′ ∈ Zp. The commitment scheme is per-
fectly binding. A simulated common reference string consists





′+S ′ . The commitment
scheme then becomes perfectly hiding. The simulation trap-
door is tk = (R′, S ′), and we can use it to reveal a commitment
to 0 to any other value δ ∈ Zp. Due to the DLIN assumption,
we have that any PPT adversary cannot tell a real common ref-
erence string apart from a simulated one.
(Groth-Sahai Proofs): Groth-Sahai NI proof system for bilinear
groups consists of four PPT algorithms, (KNI , P,V, X), where
the key generator KNI takes as input a system parameter (p,G1,
GT , ê, g) and outputs a common reference string crs = (F,H,U,
V,W, U′,V ′,W′) and an extraction key xk; the algorithm P
takes as input crs, a problem instance and a witness (· · · , xi, · · · ,
δ j, · · · ) and outputs a proof π; the verification algorithm V takes
as input crs, a problem instance, and a proof π, and outputs 1
indicating that π is valid or 0 indicating that π is invalid; and the
extraction algorithm X takes as input crs, a problem instance,
and a proof π, and outputs (· · · , xi, · · · ).
Groth-Sahai NI proofs have perfect completeness, and per-
fect soundness on a real common reference string. Besides,
they have perfect partial knowledge: the extraction algorithm
will extract (· · · , xi, · · · ) from the proof, such that there is a
solution for the equations using these xi’s. Groth-Sahai proof-
s also have perfect witness-indistinguishability on a simulated
common reference string: if there are many possible witnesses
for the equations being satisfiable, the proof π does not reveal
anything about which witness was used by the prover in gener-
ating π.
In our construction (Sec. 5.4), we use two NI proof systems:
NIWI and NIZK. The NIWI proof system is used for showing
that a BB-signature σ is valid with respect to either PKi or PK j,
i.e.
NIWI{α : ê(α, gH(otvk)PKi) = ê(g, g)∨ê(α, gH(otvk)PK j) = ê(g, g)}.
The NIZK proof system is used for showing that the commit-
ment c = (c1, c2, c3) = (Frc U t,Hsc V t, grc+sc W tσ) in the NIWI
proof π1 and the ciphertext y = (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5) = (Fry ,Hsy ,
gry+syσ, (gtagK)ry , (gtagL)sy ), where tag = H(otvk), contain the
same σ. This is equivalent to showing the knowledge of a
solution to the equation (c−11 y1)F
rU t = 1 ∧ (c−12 y2)HsV t =
1 ∧ (c−13 y3) gr+sW t = 1. If c and y contain different messages,
then there will be no r, s, t satisfying all the equations above.
Groth and Sahai [18] showed a way to turn the set of equations
above to a tractable set, which has zero-knowledge proofs. The
set of equations above is equivalent to the following one, which
is tractable:
ϕ = 1 ∧ (c−11 y1)ϕFrU t = 1∧
(c−12 y2)
ϕHsV t = 1 ∧ (c−13 y3)ϕgr+sW t = 1.
This NIZK proof system was also used by Groth in constructing
a fully anonymous group signature scheme [17]. Readers may
refer to [17, 18] for more details.
5.3. High Level Description of Our Construction
As mentioned in the introduction, many OFE schemes in
the literature follows a generic framework: Alice encrypts her
signature under the arbitrator’s public key, and provides a proof
showing that the ciphertext contains her signature. To extend
this framework to AOFE, we may let Alice encrypt her signa-
ture under the arbitrator’s public key and provide a proof show-
ing that the ciphertext contains either her signature or Bob’s
signature.
Our concrete construction below follows the framework,
which is based on the idea of Groth in constructing a fully
anonymous group signature [17]. In detail, Alice’s signature
consists of a weakly secure BB-signature [7] and a strong one-
time signature. Since only the BB-signature is related to Alice’s
identity, we encrypt it under the arbitrator’s public key using K-
iltz’ tag-based encryption scheme [28], with the one-time veri-
fication key as the tag. The non-interactive proof is based on a
technique due to Groth and Sahai [18]. It is efficient and does
not require any complex NP-reduction. The proof consists of
two parts. The first part includes a commitment to Alice’s BB-
signature along with a non-interactive witness indistinguishable
(NIWI) proof showing that either Alice’s BB-signature or Bob’s
BB-signature on the one-time verification key is in the com-
mitment. The second part is non-interactive zero-knowledge
(NIZK) proof (of knowledge) showing that the commitmen-
t and the ciphertext contains the same thing. These two parts
together imply that the ciphertext contains a BB-signature on
the message generated by either Alice or Bob. Both the cipher-
text and the proof are authenticated using the one-time signing
key. Guaranteed by the strong unforgeability of the one-time
signature, no efficient adversary can modify the ciphertext or
the proof.
5.4. The Concrete Scheme and Security Analysis
Our proposed concrete scheme, AOFE, is shown in Fig. 2.
Theorem 3. The proposed AOFE is secure in the multi-user
setting and chosen-key model without random oracles, provided
that DLIN assumption and SDH assumption hold.
AOFE follows the framework of the generic construction
proposed in Sec. 4. Intuitively, the resolution ambiguity is guar-
anteed by the extractability and soundness of the NIWI proof of
knowledge system. The signer ambiguity and security against
verifiers are due to the CCA security of the encryption scheme.
Security against signers and security against the arbitrator are
guaranteed by the weak unforgeability of BB-signature scheme.
Proof of the security of the scheme almost follows that of our
generic construction of AOFE.
One may notice that a NIWI proof π1 and a NIZK proof
π2 are used in the generation of partial signatures in AOFE,
while only a NIZK proof is required in the generic construc-
tion GAOFE. This is not to say the instantiation deviates from
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• PMGen takes 1k and outputs PM = (1k, p,G1,GT , ê, g) so that G1 and GT are cyclic groups of prime order p; g is a random
generator of G1; ê : G1 ×G1 → GT is an admissible bilinear pairing; and group operations on G1 and GT can be efficiently
performed.
• SetupTTP: The arbitrator runs the key generation algorithm of the non-interactive proof system to generate a common refer-
ence string crs and an extraction key xk, i.e. (crs, xk)← KNI(1k), where crs = (F,H,U,V,W,U′, V ′,W ′). It also randomly
selects K, L ← G1, and sets (APK, AS K) = ((crs,K, L), xk), where F,H,K, L together form the public key of the tag-based
encryption scheme [28], and xk is the extraction key of the NIWI proof system [17, 18], which is also the decryption key of
the tag-based encryption scheme.
• SetupUser: Each user Ui randomly selects xi ← Zp, and sets (PKi, S Ki) = (gxi , xi).
• PSig: To partially sign a message m with verifier U j, user Ui does the following.
1. Call the key generation algorithm of S to generate a one-time key pair (otvk, otsk).
2. Use S Ki to compute a BB-signature σ on H(otvk), i.e. σ← g1/(xi+H(otvk)).
3. Compute a tag-based encryption ([28]) y of σ, i.e. y = (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5)← E.Epk(σ, H(otvk)), where pk = (F,H,K, L).
4. Compute an NIWI proof π1 showing that σ is a valid signature under either PKi or PK j, i.e. π1 ←
PWI(crs, (ê(g, g), PKi, PK j, H(otvk)), (σ)), which shows that the following holds:
ê(σ, PKi · gH(otvk)) = ê(g, g) ∨ ê(σ, PK j · gH(otvk)) = ê(g, g).
5. Compute an NIZK proof π2 showing that y and the commitment C to σ in π1 contain the same σ, i.e. π2 ←
PZK(crs, (y, π1), (r, s, t)).
6. Use otsk to sign the whole transcript and the message M, i.e. σot ← S.S otsk(M∥π1∥y∥π2∥PKi∥PK j).
The partial signature σP of Ui on message M then consists of (otvk, σot, π1, y, π2).
• PVer: After obtaining Ui’s partial signature σP = (otvk, σot, π1, y, π2), the verifier U j checks the following. If any one fails,
U j rejects; otherwise, it accepts.
1. if σot is a valid one-time signature on M∥π1∥y∥π2∥PKi∥PK j under otvk;
2. if π1 is a valid NIWI proof, i.e. VWI(crs, (ê(g, g), PKi, PK j, H(otvk)), π1)
?
= 1;
3. if π2 is a valid NIZK proof, i.e. VZK(crs, (y, π1), π2)
?
= 1;
• Sig: To sign a message M with verifier U j, user Ui generates a partial signature σP as in PSig, and set the full signature σF
as σF = (σP, σ).
• Ver: After receiving σF on M from Ui, user U j checks if PVer(M, σP, {PKi, PK j}, APK)
?
= 1, and if ê(σ, PKi · gH(otvk))
?
=
ê(g, g). If any of the checks fails, U j rejects; otherwise, it accepts.
• Res: After receiving Ui’s partial signature σP on message M from user U j, the arbitrator firstly checks the validity of σP. If
invalid, it returns ⊥ to U j. Otherwise, it extracts σ from π1 by calling σ← Xxk(crs, π1). The arbitrator returns σ to U j.
Figure 2: Our Proposed Concrete Scheme of AOFE, AOFE
the generic construction. In fact, proofs π1 and π2 functional-
ly serve as the NIZK proof in GAOFE. To see it, notice that
the simulator of the NIZK proof (in GAOFE) is mainly used in
the proof of signer ambiguity. A simulated partial signature is
generated by first using the intended verifier U j’s secret key to
generate a (conventional) signature and then running the NIZK
simulator to produce a simulated proof to show that the cipher-
text contains either the signer Ui’s signature or U j’s signature.
While in the instantiation, the NIWI proof π1 is simulated by
using U j’s signature to show that there is a signature of either
Ui or U j, and the NIZK proof π2 is simulated by calling the
corresponding simulator to show that the (tag-based) ciphertext
contains a signature same as the witness used in π1.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed the notion of ambiguous opti-
mistic fair exchange (AOFE), and gave a formal security mod-
el for it. We discussed the relationship among some variants
of the model, and showed that signer ambiguity and security
against the arbitrator together imply security against verifier-
s (in a weaker sense). We revisited two generic constructions
of OFE, and showed that they cannot be simply extended to
AOFE. We then proposed a generic construction of AOFE, and
proved its security under the proposed multi-user setting and
chosen-key model. We also proposed a concrete and efficien-
t construction of AOFE in bilinear groups, security of which is
based on Decision Linear assumption and Strong Diffie-Hellman
assumption without random oracles.
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